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TWITTER, PARODY, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH TO
TWITTER PARODY DEFAMATION
Emma Lux *
Twitter parody defamation cases raise novel questions about how to
translate defamation law to Twitter’s interactive platform. What constitutes a “reasonable” reader on Twitter? What content is relevant to interpreting the meaning of a tweet from a parody account? The answers to
these questions will have far-reaching effects for online speech. Parody authors are already vulnerable to defamation liability, particularly on Twitter
where their statements often appear with very little context. Twitter parody
accounts, which produce important political and social commentary, risk
defamation lawsuits, as well as, in some states, criminal liability for online
impersonation. This Note proposes a methodology for interpreting the defamatory meaning of a tweet that the author intended as parody. It argues
for a contextual approach that aligns with First Amendment principles and
seeks to ensure that core political speech continues to flourish on Twitter
parody accounts.

J.D. Candidate, 2021, Georgetown University Law Center. The author would like to thank Professor Erin Carroll for her support and insightful feedback. She is also grateful to the editors
of Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review for their comments and assistance.
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INTRODUCTION

“[C]elebrating a week-long anniversary with Twitter and no #lawsuits
for #defamation, #slander, #libel, or #tortiousinterference!” 1
In 2014, a college student created a Twitter account named Todd
Levitt 2.0 to parody his professor, Todd Levitt. 2 The parody account’s
handle 3 was “@levittlawyer” 4 and its biography section (“bio”) 5 stated that
it was a “badass parody on our favorite lawyer.” 6 The student made the account to mock the professor’s own personal account, in which Todd Levitt
represented himself as a “badass lawyer,” and tweeted statements like how
he “‘tore it up’” in his university days and how he once served alcohol to
his current students. 7
The parody account lampooned Levitt by making references to partying and drinking, calling into question his competency as a lawyer. 8 One
tweet stated, “‘Buying me a drink at Cabin Karaoke will get you extra
[credit], but it’s not like that matters because you are guaranteed an A in

1. @levittlawyer, TWITTER (Apr. 22, 2014, 10:56 PM), https://twitter.com/levittlawyer
/status/458801512182214656 [https://archive.is/ofQnc] (tweeting from the Levitt 2.0 parody account).
2. Levitt v. Felton, No. 326362, 2016 WL 2944824, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. May 19, 2016);
see @levittlawyer, supra note 1.
3. Leslie Walker, Twitter Language: Twitter Slang and Key Terms Explained, LIFEWIRE
(Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.lifewire.com/twitter-slang-and-key-terms-explained-2655399,
[https://perma.cc/5HGZ-VLK6]. (describing how Twitter handles are short phrases selected by
users to describe their accounts).
4. @levittlawyer, supra note 1.
5. Amanda MacArthur, What Does the Bio Mean on Twitter?, LIFEWIRE (Dec. 2, 2019),
https://www.lifewire.com/twitter-bio-definition-3289021, [https://perma.cc/3LHA-MG8T] (Twitter users typically use the bio to “give others a short intro about who [they] are…”);
@levittlawyer, supra note 1.
6. @levittlawyer, supra note 1.
7. Levitt, 2016 WL 2944824, at *1.
8. Id.
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[the] syllabus.’” 9 Another said, “What’s the difference between the internet and my tweeted legal advice? A: none. They’re both 100% accurate!” 10
When Todd Levitt found the parody account, he sued the student in
Michigan state court for defamation. 11 The court in Levitt v. Felton
(“Levitt”) held that the parody account tweets were nondefamatory parody
protected by the First Amendment. 12 Because the tweets demeaned the legal and academic professions and employed “rhetorical hyperbole,” the
court concluded that they could not reasonably be understood as coming
from a college professor. 13 Additionally, “[w]hen read in context” of the
account’s name and disclaimer tweets from the same account, the court
found that the tweets were nondefamatory. 14 The account’s name, “Levitt
2.0,” weighed toward parody, the court reasoned, since it “hints at the notion that [the account] is a spoof.” 15 And the account’s periodic posting of
“disclaimer” tweets heavily favored the conclusion that the tweets were not
defamatory. 16
Other state and federal courts have considered similar factors as the
Levitt court when analyzing whether tweets, or other similar social media
posts, 17 are defamatory. For example, courts have considered whether the
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at *3.
13. Id. Defamation is the intentional publication of a statement of fact which is false, unprivileged, and which causes special damage or has a natural tendency to injure reputation.
RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 1.8 (2d ed. 2020).
14. Levitt, 2016 WL 2944824, at *3.
15. Id.
16. Id. (“[T]he idea that the tweets were a parody is soundly reinforced by [the account’s]
several disclaimers . . . including one that says, ‘This is a parody account. You can find the real
[Todd Levitt] @levittlaw.’”).
17. Because there have been so few Twitter defamation cases that specifically involve
parody and have resulted in published opinions, see, e.g., id. at *1. This Note refers to some cases involving different social media websites when the relevant features are analogizable to features on Twitter. It also addresses cases involving Twitter and defamation, but not parody specifically.
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name of an account that allegedly posted a defamatory statement hints at
parody 18 or not, 19 as was the case in Levitt. 20 Courts have also considered
context such as the posting account’s bio, 21 profile picture, 22 use of Twitter
as a medium, 23 and the informal nature of internet speech 24 as part of the
determination of whether tweets are defamatory. Some courts have looked
to extrinsic, actual events surrounding the allegedly defamatory tweet to
interpret the statement in context, 25 while other courts consider only the
language of the tweet itself. 26
But what exactly is the appropriate context in which to analyze an allegedly defamatory tweet, and when does that context translate as parody to
a reasonable reader? Answering these questions has proven difficult even
in traditional media, as courts struggle to articulate the average reader’s interpretative capabilities. 27 The choice of Twitter as a medium raises addi18. O’Donnell v. Knott, 283 F. Supp. 3d 286, 301 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (holding that a post on
the social media website Disqus from a parody account named Knotty the Tramp was not defamatory since the account’s name indicated the account was parody to the reasonable reader).
19. White v. Ortiz, No. 13–cv–251–SM, 2015 WL 5331279, at *5 (D.N.H. Sept. 14,
2015) (finding a tweet from a fake Twitter account called “The Real June White” defamatory
since the account’s name did not indicate that the account was intended as parody).
20. Levitt, 2016 WL 2944824, at *3.
21. See, e.g., TRG Motorsports, LLC v. Media Barons, LLC, No. B244937, 2013 WL
5428769, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (finding statements from a website and associated Twitter
parody account non-defamatory when the website included biographical information, similar to a
Twitter bio, describing the parodied individual as a “little person” named “Devin Fuckler”).
22. See, e.g., O’Donnell, 283 F. Supp. 3d at 301–02 (finding a post from a Disqus account
nondefamatory when its profile picture featured an unflattering image of the subject of the parody
account drinking from a bottle of alcohol).
23. See, e.g., Jacobus v. Trump, 51 N.Y.S.3d 330, 342 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (describing
how speech on Twitter is “rife with vague and simplistic insults”).
24. See, e.g., Feld v. Conway, 16 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D. Mass. 2014).
25. See, e.g., Jacobus, 51 N.Y.S.3d at 342 (“[T]he . . . context of defendants’ [allegedly
defamatory tweet] is the familiar back and forth between a political commentator and the subject
of her criticism[] and . . . the Republican presidential primary”).
26. See, e.g., Winter v. Pinkins, No. 14–cv–8817, 2017 WL 5496278, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 17, 2017) (finding that a tweet is defamatory based solely on the language of the tweet
alone).
27. See infra, Part II.
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tional questions regarding how to determine whether a tweet, when read in
context, is protected parody or not. 28
Furthermore, criminal and civil liabilities that threaten to chill core
First Amendment speech 29 hang in the balance of this discussion. A new
wave of laws criminalizing online impersonation, or “e-personation” 30 prohibit “credibly” impersonating a person to cause “harm.” 31 While the laws
are aimed at penalizing actions such as cyberbullying and catfishing, 32 critics argue that these laws may impermissibly sweep up protected parody accounts in their enforcement. 33 Parody authors often imitate their subject to
criticize the individual, 34 which could be interpreted as intent to cause
“harm.” 35 Additionally, Twitter parody authors that critique politicians 36 or

28. See Patrick H. Hunt, Tortious Tweets: A Practical Guide to Applying Traditional Defamation Law to Twibel Claims, 73 LA. L. REV. 559, 562 (2013) (describing how to apply existing
defamation law to Twitter defamation cases).
29. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 54–56 (1988) (describing
parody as core First Amendment speech).
30. E-personation is the act of “impersonat[ing] someone online in order to ‘harm’ that
person.” See Corynne McSherry, “E-Personification” Bill Could Be Used to Punish Online Critics, Undermine First Amendment Protections for Parody, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 22,
2010),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/08/e-personation-bill-could-be-used-punish-online
[https://perma.cc/73NY-YCZ8]; see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5 (West 2020).
31. PENAL § 528.5.
32. See, e.g., Antonella Santi, “Catfishing”: A Comparative Analysis of U.S. v. Canadian
Catfishing Laws and Their Limitations, 44 S. ILL. UNIV. L.J. 73, 78 (2019) (describing how “Catfishing takes two primary forms: (1) obtaining another individual[’]s information without consent
to gain access to their online profile or impersonating them by creating a fake profile; or (2) creating an entirely fictitious profile”).
33. McSherry, supra note 30 (arguing that California’s online impersonation statute may
squelch online “political activism”).
34. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 54 (describing how famous American cartoonist Thomas Nast portrayed William “Boss” Tweed in satirical cartoons that constituted a
“sustained attack” on the politician).
35. See McSherry, supra note 30 (describing how impersonating a person online to “embarrass” them may be interpreted as causing “harm” under the e-personation state laws).
36. See, e.g., Nunes v. Twitter, Inc., No. 19-1715, 2020 Va. Cir. LEXIS 89 at *1–2 (Va.
Cir. June 24, 2020).
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other public figures 37 currently face civil liability that threatens to chill
speech regarding matters of public interest.
As a result, it is critical to develop an administrable methodology to
determine whether allegedly defamatory tweets are protected parody. This
Note anticipates a path forward. It first describes the approaches courts use
in traditional media when determining whether a parody statement is defamatory. 38 Then, this Note shifts to the Twitter context, describing how
courts have analyzed allegedly defamatory parody tweets. 39 Finally, this
Note proposes a method for determining whether parody tweets are defamatory by drawing from the traditional media analysis. 40 By interpreting
tweets reasonably and in the appropriate context, courts can maintain proper First Amendment protections 41 for Twitter parody accounts.

II. DEFAMATORY MEANING AND PARODY IN TRADITIONAL MEDIA
Defamation is the intentional publication of a statement of fact which
is false, unprivileged, and which causes special damage or has a natural
tendency to injure reputation. 42 A statement has a natural tendency to diminish reputation when it lowers the esteem in which a person is held, such
as a statement which implies that a college wrestling coach committed per-

37. See, e.g., Appellant’s Opening Brief, Block v. Schulte, No. EC067254, 2019 WL
4477437, at *8, appeal docketed, No. B297198 (Cal. Ct. App., April 29, 2019) (discussing a defamation lawsuit against a Twitter parody account that criticized a well-known Los Angeles eviction attorney for harming impoverished tenants).
38. See infra Part II.
39. See infra Part III.
40. See infra Part IV.
41. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 54 (1988) (explaining how parody
has played a “prominent” role in American political debate and represents core First Amendment
speech).
42. SMOLLA, supra note 13, § 1.8. A false statement of fact, for example, could occur if
an author “attribute[d] an untrue factual assertion to the speaker.” See, e.g., Masson v. New
Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 511 (1991) (describing how “[a]n example [of a false
statement] would be a fabricated quotation of a public official admitting he had been convicted of
a serious crime when in fact he had not”). This article focuses on defamation where there are no
special damages, and the plaintiff must prove that a statement is reasonably susceptible to a defamatory meaning in order to recover.

LUX_MACROS_V4 (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

1/2/2021 10:43 PM

TWITTER, PARODY, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

7

jury. 43 Because defamation requires a statement of fact, a statement cannot
be defamatory if it cannot be “reasonably . . . understood as describing actual facts . . . or . . . events . . . .” 44 In other words, a statement cannot be
defamatory when a reasonable reader would understand that the statement,
when read in its ordinary context, is parody, not factual information. 45 For
example, the Supreme Court has found that a parody advertisement portraying a well-known minister and his mother as “drunk and immoral,” was
clearly parody in light of a parody disclaimer stating, “ad parody—not to
be taken seriously.” 46 As a result, the statement could not support the
award of damages “consistently with the First Amendment.” 47
This proposition—that statements must be understood as allegations
of facts in order to be defamatory—could at first glance seem to exclude
statements like parody from liability. Parodies, when understood as satirical by their intended audiences, convey the message that they are not false
statements of fact. 48 However, the defamatory meaning analysis does not
hinge on the meaning intended by the author. 49 Rather, the relevant question is whether “a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the statement[]
. . . impl[ies] an assertion [of fact].” 50 As a result, it is possible for an author to intend to create a parody and nonetheless produce a statement with
43. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 7 (1990) (describing a defamation
lawsuit in which a wrestling coach alleged injury to “his lifetime occupation of coach and teacher” as a result of statements that accused him of the crime of perjury).
44. See Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 49.
45. See id. at 57 (holding that a defendant may not recover from a parody that could not
be understood as alleging false statements of fact).
46. Id. at 48 (Hustler Magazine was a case flowing from the Supreme Court’s defamation
line of First Amendment cases); see generally LEE LEVINE & STEPHEN WERMIEL, THE PROGENY:
JUSTICE WILLIAM J. BRENNAN’S FIGHT TO PRESERVE THE LEGACY OF NEW YORK TIMES V.
SULLIVAN (2014). Though the case concerned an intentional infliction of emotional distress tort
claim, the First Amendment rule, that parody is protected, is analogous to the defamation context.
See Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 52–53 (analogizing respondent’s emotional distress claim to a
defamation claim, both of which require the “breathing space” provided by the First Amendment).
47. Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 57.
48. See, e.g., id. at 48–49.
49. David McCraw, How Do Readers Read? Social Science and the Law of Libel, 41
CATH. U. L. REV. 81, 99–100 (1991).
50. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21 (1990) (emphasis added).
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defamatory meaning if the reasonable reader could mistake it for a truthful
statement when viewed in its normal context. 51
Thus, to determine whether a statement that the author intended as
parody is susceptible to defamatory meaning, courts must step into the
shoes of the reasonable reader, 52 interpret the statement in its ordinary context, 53 and determine whether the reader could rationally understand it as
alleging actual facts. 54 While such an inquiry may appear relatively
straightforward, the analysis raises a number of difficult questions regarding how readers understand meaning and construe statements, even for traditional media. For example, who is the reasonable reader? What does he
or she understand as parody? What is the appropriate context in which to
view a statement? The following two sections describe how courts have
defined the reasonable reader and the relevant context of an allegedly defamatory statement in the realm of traditional media.

A. The Reasonable Reader
Because defamatory meaning hinges on a hypothetical reader’s understanding of the statement at issue, 55 how courts define the reasonable
reader’s interpretive abilities can influence the analysis. 56 Courts consider
both actual facts about reader habits, as well as First Amendment theories
about the rationality of market actors, when determining the reasonable
reader’s traits. 57
51. See, e.g., Embrey v. Holly, 442 A.2d 966, 968, 972–73 (Md. 1982) (holding that a
radio host’s statement that the host intended as parody, but that “certain . . . listeners [reasonably]
did not recognize the ‘humor’ in the radio host’s words” could be the basis for defamation damages).
52. McCraw, supra note 49, at 99.
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 563 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
54. Id.
55. Id.; see also McCraw, supra note 49, at 99–100 (describing how the court determines
defamatory meaning).
56. See McCraw, supra note 49, at 103 (describing different interpretations of the reasonable reader in defamation law).
57. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The Rational Audience as First Amendment
Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 808 (2010) (describing how the Supreme Court relied on actual
reader reactions to a particular statement, as well as the principle that readers are inherently reasonable, when construing the language at issue in Cohen v. California).
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The reasonable reader is an objective, hypothetical figure whose interpretation of a statement need not conform with actual peoples’ interpretations. 58 Instead, a statement’s meaning is a question of law, and the court
may decide that the reasonable reader’s interpretation of a statement is distinct from the meaning “intended by the writer or actually received by
readers.” 59 Accordingly, a plaintiff cannot sustain a defamation claim by
simply proving that the alleged statement would have “wound[ed] the feelings” of a sensitive person. 60
Nonetheless, courts often rely on evidence about how readers actually
intake information in their determination of how a reasonable reader would
behave in certain circumstances. 61 Facts and assumptions about reading
habits, such as how readers may not read small print, are relevant to the defamatory meaning analysis. 62 For instance, in Stanton v. Metro Corp., the
First Circuit took into account how readers may not see a disclaimer when
it is printed in small font between two other lines of large, bolded print,
when interpreting whether a magazine article was defamatory. 63 In Embrey
v. Holly, the Maryland Court of Appeals relied on the fact that people had
actually mistaken a statement on a radio show to be true when determining
how the reasonable reader would understand the statement. 64 In Embrey,
the court found that the listener could reasonably take the radio host’s onair statement, that the plaintiff “[p]robably [hurt his knee while] carrying
[a] TV during [a] blizzard [that occurred the week prior],” as alleging actual facts. 65 In Cohen v. California, the United States Supreme Court (“Su58. San Francisco Bay Guardian, Inc. v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 467 (Ct.
App. 1993); see also RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 4:17 (2d ed. 2020) (describing how the reasonable reader is hypothetical, rather than the lowest common denominator).
59. See McCraw, supra note 49, at 100.
60. MADELEINE SCHACHTER, LAW OF THE INTERNET 243 (2001).
61. See, e.g., McCraw, supra note 49, at 103–04 (arguing that the Milkovich majority and
dissent’s different interpretations of the statement at issue have to do with different interpretations
of how readers comprehend language).
62. Stanton v. Metro Corp., 438 F.3d 119, 126 (1st Cir. 2006).
63. Id.
64. Embrey v. Holly, 442 A.2d 966, 968 (Md. 1982).
65. Id.
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preme Court”) also implicitly relied on how people actually reacted to particular language in its determination of defamatory meaning. 66
In addition to contemplating facts or assumptions about actual reader
habits when interpreting the reasonable reader’s comprehension abilities,
courts have also relied on First Amendment theories about the rationality of
marketplace actors. 67 Since the birth of the modern First Amendment, the
Supreme Court has conceived readers as inherently rational beings 68 aware
of widely-known political and cultural events and figures. 69 In Cohen, for
example, the Court concluded that a reasonable reader of the message on
the appellant’s jacket, which stated “Fuck the Draft,” would understand
that the jacket was not intended as a personal insult. 70 Though the Court
acknowledged that the same language used on the appellant’s jacket was
often used for personal attacks, 71 it favored an interpretation of the reasonable reader that was attuned to context and nuance. 72 The Court held that
the reasonable reader would be aware of the national draft opposition context and would understand the statement as political. 73
As a result, when interpreting the reasonable reader’s characteristics,
courts look both to actual reader traits and to principles of rationality un-

66. See, e.g., McCraw, supra note 49, at 103–04; see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15, 20 (1971) (describing how nobody actually reacted violently to allegedly inciteful speech
when interpreting whether the reasonable reader would react violently to the language).
67. Lidsky, supra note 57, at 808.
68. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628–29 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (describing how no rational person would react violently to the pamphlets); McCraw, supra note 49,
at 100–01.
69. See, e.g., Cohen, 403 U.S. at 17 (implicitly assuming that reasonable readers of appellant’s jacket would understand it as a reference to the national context of opposition to the draft).
70. Id. at 20.
71. Id.
72. Id. (“No individual actually or likely to be present could reasonably have regarded the
words on appellant’s jacket as a direct personal insult.”) (emphasis added).
73. Id.; see also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 46 (1988) (considering
how the parodied individual was a nationally known minister when interpreting a statement).
Although the Supreme Court did not interpret whether the statement was defamatory in Hustler,
commentators have used the case when interpreting which context is relevant to the defamatory
meaning analysis. McCraw, supra note 49, at 100.
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dergirding the First Amendment. 74 However, those two factors can conflict, such as when an author reasonably expects that readers will understand a statement as parody, but readers nonetheless mistake the statement
to be true. 75 In those circumstances, courts often interpret in favor of the
First Amendment principles of rationality, invoking the objective, hypothetical reader to reject the interpretation of actual readers. 76 In New Times,
Inc. v. Isaacks, for instance, the Texas Supreme Court found that an article
in the Dallas Observer intended as parody, which had been reportedly misunderstood by many readers to allege actual facts about the plaintiff, was
not defamatory since the reasonable reader would understand the allegedly
defamatory article as a joke. 77 The author of the article intended to use
parody to mock a local school which had recently taken extreme action to
penalize a menial student transgression. 78 In doing so, the author wrote a
fake parody article entitled “Stop the Madness,” describing how the school
handcuffed a “diminutive six-year old” for suspicion of making “terroristic
threats.” 79 While the parody article appeared under the heading, “News,”
and thus confused several actual readers who took the statement as true, 80
the court reasoned that the absurdity of the claims in the article made clear
to the reasonable reader that they were parody. 81 While the article had a
“superficial degree of plausibility,” the court noted that “such is the hallmark of satire.” 82
74. McCraw, supra note 49, at 100; Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628–29
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
75. See, e.g., San Francisco Bay Guardian, Inc. v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464,
465 (Ct. App. 1993) (describing how a plaintiff understood a newspaper article which the author
intended as parody to allege actual facts).
76. Id. at 467 (holding that “the April Fool’s section of the paper was obviously and unambiguously a parody”).
77. New Times, Inc. v. Isaacks, 146 S.W.3d 144, 161 (Tex. 2004); RODNEY A. SMOLLA,
LAW OF DEFAMATION § 4:15 (2d ed. 2020).
78. New Times, Inc., 146 S.W.3d at 148 (describing how a local school called police officers to retrieve a boy who had written a violent story from his class).
79. Id. at 147–48.
80. Id. at 159.
81. Id. at 161; SMOLLA, supra note 77, § 4:15.
82. New Times, Inc., 146 S.W.3d at 161.
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B. The Relevant Context
To determine whether a statement an author intended as parody is
susceptible to defamatory meaning, courts must not only define the reasonable reader’s characteristics and step into their shoes to interpret the statement 83 as described above. Courts must also interpret the statement in its
context to determine whether the reader could rationally understand the
statement as alleging actual facts. 84 The way in which courts define the
context relevant to the defamatory meaning analysis is often determinative
in defamation cases, particularly those involving parody. This section describes how courts apply the Restatement Second of Torts (“Restatement”)
approach to statements authors intended as parody in traditional media.

1. Divergent Approaches to Extrinsic Content
The Restatement is contradictory on the matter of defining the context
relevant to the defamatory meaning analysis, which has led to divergent
approaches regarding content extrinsic to what readers ordinarily read or
hear with an allegedly defamatory statement. 85 The Restatement defines an
allegedly defamatory statement’s relevant context as “all parts of the communication that are ordinarily heard or read with it.” 86 For instance, “the
entire contents of a personal letter are considered as the context of any part
of it because a recipient of the letter ordinarily reads the entire communication at one time.” 87 Courts generally attempt to follow this approach. 88
These courts have required that allegedly defamatory statements contained
in magazine or newspaper articles be read in the context of the article as a

83. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 563 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 563 cmt. d.
85. See, e.g., Joseph H. King, Jr., Defining the Internal Context for Communications Containing Allegedly Defamatory Headline Language, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 863, 888–89 (2003) (describing the Restatement’s “facially contradictory language” and the different approaches courts
have taken as a result).
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 563 cmt. d.
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Norse v. Henry Holt & Co., 991 F.2d 563, 567 (9th Cir. 1993); Polygram
Records. v. Superior Court, 170 Cal. App. 3d 543, 554 (Ct. App. 1985).
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whole, declining to dissect articles line by line. 89 A documentary film clip
could not be analyzed alone, explained one court, but must be analyzed
within the context of the film as a whole. 90
However, a mechanical application of the Restatement approach 91
seems to conflict with First Amendment principles in certain settings. 92
For example, courts are split on whether allegedly defamatory front-page
headlines should be interpreted in the context of the internal article, which
may qualify the defamatory imputation contained in the headline. 93 The
note to the defamation section of the Restatement takes the approach that
the “text of a newspaper article is ordinarily not the context of the headline” when “circumstances” indicate that the public would not “ordinarily”
read them together. 94 Thus, the Restatement rule points to the conclusion
that courts should read front-page headlines alone, without the context of
the internal article. 95 Unlike a headline that appears directly above the article it describes, such that readers would “ordinarily” read both the headline
and the article together, 96 “circumstances” indicate that readers frequently

89. See Cianci v. New Times Pub. Co., 639 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1980) (considering the
statements in context of the article as a whole, including the article’s internal organization); see
also Toney v. WCCO Television, Midwest Cable & Satellite, Inc., 85 F.3d 383, 396 (8th Cir.
1996) (“The question is not whether that article can be divided into two parts, and each of those
parts so analyzed separately from each other that each would appear to be free from defamatory
meaning. The article must be construed as a whole.”).
90. Smith v. Cuban Am. Nat’l Found., 731 So.2d 702, 705–06 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding that the trial court erred in showing an allegedly defamatory statement from a documentary film to the jury because a “publication must be considered in its totality”) (citing Byrd v.
Hustler Magazine, 433 So.2d 593, 595 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)).
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 563 cmt. d.
92. Leonard M. Niehoff, Opinions, Implications, and Confusions, 28 COMMC’NS
LAWYER 19, 21 (Nov. 2011) (describing how the Restatement approach would dictate a “form of
a heckler’s veto” in the context of front-page headlines).
93. See, e.g., King, supra note 85, at 878.
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 563 cmt. d.
95. See id. (noting that the text of a newspaper article “may explain or qualify a defamatory imputation conveyed when the headline alone is read”).
96. Id.
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only read the front-page headlines of publications without taking the time
to flip to the internal article, or even to purchase the publication. 97
On the other hand, modern First Amendment law says that the reasonable reader should be rational and attuned to contextual clues. 98 This
fact weighs in favor of determining that the hypothetical reasonable reader,
as conceived by the Supreme Court, would take the time to flip to the internal article when reading a front-page headline, such that the headline and
the internal article should be considered together. 99 As one commentator
noted, the “law . . . indulges in a fiction [to avoid] a form of heckler’s veto,
where the predispositions and personalities of a less-than-ideal audience
[that do not read articles] determine the rights of the speaker.” 100
Because of the First Amendment concerns, the majority approach is
to read a potentially defamatory front-page headline in the context of the
internal article as a whole when determining whether it is capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning. 101 For example, the Mississippi Supreme
Court found a front-page headline non-defamatory when read in the context
of the internal article it referenced. 102 The headline said, “‘[Plaintiff was]
found in default on grain storage contract[,]’ . . . ‘Fraud trial opens . . .
.’” 103 Though the second clause of the headline alone reasonably implied
97. See, e.g., Kaelin v. Globe Commc’ns Corp., 162 F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 1998) (describing how readers often skim magazine headlines on the grocery store checkout line).
98. See supra Part II.A. See also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628–29 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Lidsky, supra note 57, at 815 (describing how, while “Justice
Holmes and Brandeis provided the building blocks . . . any number of First Amendment doctrines
rely on a model of the audience as rational, skeptical, and capable of sorting through masses of
information to find truth”); for a modern example, see, e.g., Baker v. L.A. Herald Exam’r, 42
Cal.3d 254, 262 (1986) (describing how a defamatory statement “is to be measured…by its . . .
natural and probable effect upon the mind of the average reader” and what that reader “could
have reasonably understood”).
99. Additionally, in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 4 (1990), the Supreme
Court read a headline stating, “Maple beat the law with the ‘big lie,’” together with a column that
accused the coach of lying and setting a bad example for children. Determining that “[t]he clear
impact’” of the headline and column “‘is that [the plaintiff] lied at the hearing after . . . having
given his solemn oath to tell the truth,’” the Court held that the statement was defamatory.
100. Niehoff, supra note 92, at 21.
101. Id.
102. Blake v. Gannett Co., 529 So.2d 595, 605 (Miss. 1988).
103. Id.
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the plaintiff was on trial for fraud, the court reasoned that the internal article clarified that an individual other than the plaintiff was actually on trial,
such that the headline was not defamatory. 104
Only a minority of courts track the Restatement rule regarding frontpage headlines, considering the front-page headline separately from the internal article under certain “circumstances.” 105 When determining whether
the article and headline should be read together, these courts consider factors such as the accessibility of the internal article from the headline 106 and
whether the front cover points readers to the relevant internal content.107
For example, one court held that the question of whether an article printed
seventeen pages from an allegedly defamatory headline was relevant context to consider belonged to the jury. 108 By contrast, since there is so little
content that readers “ordinarily” 109 read when viewing an allegedly defamatory statement contained in a front-page headline, the majority approach “indulges in a fiction” to avoid chilling speech and reads the statement in the context of the internal article. 110
2. Parody and Extrinsic Content
The question of whether courts should consider content outside what
readers “ordinarily” 111 read arises in circumstances other than just newspaper headlines. Cases involving parody, for instance, often raise extrinsic
content questions. 112 Parody authors rely on many contextual clues to
104. Id.
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 563 cmt. d; King Jr., supra note 85, at 884.
106. See Kaelin v. Globe Commc’ns Corp., 162 F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 1998).
107. Stanton v. Metro Corp., 438 F.3d 119, 126 (1st Cir. 2006).
108. Kaelin, 162 F.3d at 1041.
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 563, cmt. d.
110. Niehoff, supra, note 92, at 21; see also King, Jr., supra, note 85, at 867 (proposing a
rule for how to interpret allegedly defamatory headlines).
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 563 cmt. d.
112. See, e.g., McCraw, supra note 49, at 94–95 (describing how “[t]he problem [with
parody] is that statements of opinion, as well as parody and hyperbole, may be read to imply the
existence of facts” absent contextual clues).
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communicate their intended meaning to their readers. 113 For instance, parody authors often use disclaimers to describe that the relevant text was not
intended to allege actual facts about the subject of the parody. 114 Parody
authors also frequently rely on hyperbolic rhetoric, imaginative expression,
and many other situational cues to indicate to readers that a particular publication or statement is parody. 115 One newspaper printed a parody section
of the newspaper upside-down to signal the satirical nature of the section to
readers, for instance. 116 Additionally, because the Supreme Court has described parody as core First Amendment speech, 117 courts are often keen to
protect the genre and consider content outside of what readers “ordinarily”
might see. 118
As a result, courts often consider extrinsic content when determining
whether a statement intended as parody is defamatory. 119 In San Francisco
Bay Guardian v. Superior Court, for instance, a landlord sued a newspaper
for defamation, alleging that a statement in a parody letter-to-the-editor was
defamatory. 120 The letter stated, purportedly in the voice of the plaintiff, “I
don’t understand why [a public figure] is so upset about electroshock ther113. See, e.g., Amy Johnson, Decrowning Doubles: Indexicality and Aspect in a Bahraini
Twitter Parody Account, 48 AL-’ARABIYYA 61, 65, 67 (2015) (describing how Twitter parody
accounts rely on linguistic, social, and political clues to create meaning).
114. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 48 (1988) (describing how
the meaning of a parody statement was informed by a disclaimer in the bottom right corner of the
advertisement in which the allegedly defamatory statement appeared).
115. See, e.g., Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Assn. Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970) (interpreting a parody statement in light of its imaginative expression).
116. San Francisco Bay Guardian, Inc. v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 466 (Ct.
App. 1993).
117. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 54 (“Satirical cartoons have played a prominent role in public and political debate.”).
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 563 cmt. d; cf. San Francisco Bay Guardian,
21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 466 (considering an allegedly defamatory parody article in the context of a
parody disclaimer in the front of the newspaper, which readers might not have seen when reading
the article).
119. See, e.g., New Times, Inc. v. Isaacks, 146 S.W.3d 144, 159 (Tex. 2004) (considering
whether a newspaper had printed parody articles in past issues when determining whether a parody article in the current issue was defamatory).
120. San Francisco Bay Guardian, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 465.
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apy. I find that my tenants who have undergone this treatment are much
more cooperative.” 121 The court reasoned that the statement could plausibly
be mistaken as true in the context of the letter alone, as the statement appeared in the same type-face as the normal paper and contained a subtle
brand of parody. 122
Nonetheless, the San Francisco Bay Guardian court held that the
statement could not reasonably be understood as defamatory. 123 Notably,
most of the court’s reasoning drew from extrinsic content that an actual
reader may not have “ordinarily” seen in one sitting under the Restatement
approach. 124 Relying on earlier articles in the parody section of the paper
that were more obvious parody, “recognizable as jokes at first glance,” 125
the court concluded that the reasonable reader would have taken the comedic nature of the adjacent articles into account when interpreting the allegedly defamatory statement in the parody letter-to-the-editor. 126 In light of
the additional articles, the court held the statement in the parody letter-tothe-editor was not defamatory since it could not be understood as alleging
actual facts about the plaintiff. 127

III. CURRENT APPROACHES TO DEFAMATORY MEANING AND PARODY
IN TWEETS
While the defamatory meaning analysis already raises difficult questions in traditional media, 128 courts today also address additional questions
regarding how the characteristics of Twitter 129 and Twitter parody ac121. Id. at 464–65.
122. Id. at 466 (describing how “[o]n the page containing the letters to the editor, some of
the material is not [as] obvious” as parody material on other pages).
123. Id. at 467.
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 563 cmt. c.
125. San Francisco Bay Guardian, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 466.
126. Id. (describing how some of the jokes in the newspaper’s other sections were “recognizable as jokes at first glance,” compared to the more subtle parody statement at issue there).
127. Id.
128. See discussion supra Part II.
129. See, e.g., Jacobus v. Trump, 51 N.Y.S.3d 330, 343 (Sup. Ct. 2017) (analyzing an
allegedly defamatory tweet); Feld v. Conway, 16 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D. Mass. 2014)
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counts 130 affect the analysis. The following section summarizes divergent
approaches courts have taken when interpreting what the reasonable reader
of a tweet understands as parody, as well as what content extrinsic to the
tweet, if any, is relevant to the defamatory meaning analysis. Because
there have been so few cases specifically involving Twitter parody, 131 this
section also incorporates relevant analysis from courts considering Twitter
defamation not concerning parody, 132 and other social media website parody defamation cases. 133

A. Divergent Approaches to the “Reasonable Reader” of Tweets
Courts have contemplated whether the hypothetical reader of an allegedly defamatory tweet is as competent at interpreting contextual clues as
the hypothetical reader of traditional media, 134 or whether readers on Twitter almost always understand all tweets on the website to be too “loose”
and “hyperbolic” to allege actual facts. 135
The question arises from research demonstrating actual problems with
disinformation on Twitter. 136 Courts have diverged on the question of
whether evidence about how readers often struggle to discern truth from
falsity online should change how courts think about the hypothetical reasonable reader of online speech. In traditional media, courts have favored
130. See, e.g., Levitt v. Felton, No. 326362, 2016 WL 2944824, at *3–4 (Mich. Ct. App.
May 19, 2016) (analyzing an allegedly defamatory tweet from a parody account).
131. See, e.g., id. at *1. Several Twitter parody defamation cases are currently pending.
See, e.g., Nunes v. Twitter, Inc., No. 19-1715, 2020 Va. Cir. LEXIS 89 (Va. Cir. June 24, 2020).
132. Jacobus, 51 N.Y.S.3d at 342 (analyzing an allegedly defamatory tweet that was not
intended as parody).
133. O’Donnell v. Knott, 283 F. Supp. 3d 286, 301 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (analyzing an allegedly defamatory Disqus post intended as parody).
134. See Jacobus, 51 N.Y.S.3d at 343 (considering how “[t]he informal nature of conversation on Twitter tends to encourage people to talk more freely about others, including the spreading of rumors and potential falsehoods.”).
135. Id. at 342.
136. See, e.g., id. at 343 (analyzing an allegedly defamatory tweet in light of the “general
lack of coherence” of online speech); see also Shelly Banjo, Facebook, Twitter and the Digital
Disinformation Mess, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2019, 12:25 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/business/facebook-twitter-and-the-digital-disinformation-mess/2019/10/01/53334c08-e4b4-11e9b0a6-3d03721b85ef_story.html [https://perma.cc/E8F9-6QCK].
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an interpretation of readers as rational and attuned to social 137 and cultural
context, 138 even when the real audience is “less-than-ideal” at interpreting
nuances. 139 Otherwise, courts and commentators have reasoned, the actual
habits of the “less-than-ideal audience determine the rights of the speaker.” 140
However, some courts have reasoned that the reasonable reader
standard should be different for online readers from the reasonable reader
standard in traditional media. 141 These courts reason that the hypothetical
reasonable reader of tweets should be considered less willing and able to
interpret contextual clues due to evidence of actual reader problems distinguishing truth from falsity online. 142 Jacobus v. Trump exemplifies this
line of thinking. 143 The case arose when a political strategist, Cheryl Jacobus, rejected a position from Donald Trump’s presidential campaign and
then made critical comments about then-candidate Trump on cable news. 144
Following Jacobus’s comments on television, Trump tweeted
“@cherijacobus begged us for a job. We said no and she went hostile . . .
.” 145
137. See supra Part II.A.; see also New Times, Inc. v. Isaacks, 146 S.W.3d 144, 157 (Tex.
2004) (holding that an article was nondefamatory despite the fact that the article was labeled
“News” and some readers misunderstood it as alleging actual facts).
138. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 47–48 (1988) (implicitly reasoning that the reasonable readers of a parody statement knew that the parody subject was a minister,
since this information was “nationally known”).
139. Niehoff, supra note 92, at 21.
140. Id.; see also Nelson v. Superior Court, No. B283743, 2018 WL 1061575, at *5 (Cal.
Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2018), as modified on denial of reh’g, Mar. 27, 2018 (unpublished) (interpreting an allegedly defamatory parody YouTube video) (“While courts have recognized that online
posters often ‘play fast and loose with facts,’ this should not be taken to mean online commentators are immune from defamation liability.”).
141. See, e.g., Jacobus, 51 N.Y.S.3d at 343.
142. Id. (reasoning that readers simply presume statements are false or opinion amid the
“general lack of coherence” on the internet and Twitter specifically); see also RODNEY A.
SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 6:70.50 (2d ed. 2020) (criticizing the Jacobus court’s approach).
143. Jacobus, 51 N.Y.S.3d at 339.
144. Id. at 334.
145. Id.
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Jacobus sued Trump in New York state court for defamation, arguing
that the tweet implied provably false facts. 146 The court found that the
statements were not defamatory since no reasonable reader would interpret
the statements as true in the context of Twitter and Trump’s account. 147
The court characterized speech online and on Twitter specifically as generally rife with “slang, grammatical mistakes, spelling errors . . . .” 148 As a
result, the court reasoned that the readers of tweets, lost in what the court
called the “lack of coherence” of online speech, 149 almost always understand tweets as statements of “vigorous expressions of personal opinion.” 150 Thus, Trump’s tweet that Jacobus “‘begged’” for a job, the court
explained, “is reasonably viewed as a loose, figurative, and hyperbolic reference to [the] plaintiff’s state of mind” and is “not susceptible of objective
verification.” 151
By contrast, the Levitt court, 152 for example, did not begin the analysis
with a presumption that all tweets are too vague and simplistic to be defamatory. Instead, the court likened reasonable Twitter readers to readers
of traditional media 153 who “evaluat[e] allegedly defamatory statements . . .
in context . . . .” 154 Then, the Levitt court looked to the tweet’s context to

146. Id. at 335; see also SMOLLA, supra note 142, § 6:70.50 (describing how Jacobus argued that she could prove that the Trump campaign had in fact approached her for a job, not the
other way around, as the tweet implied).
147. Jacobus, 51 N.Y.S.3d at 343.
148. Id. (quoting Technovate v. Fanelli, No. 003713 WL 5554547, at *4 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
Sep. 10, 2015)).
149. Id.; cf. Katy Waldman, Is the Internet Making Writing Better?, NEW YORKER (July
26,
2019),
https://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/is-the-internet-making-writingbetter?verso=true [https://perma.cc/UC8E-X6LZ] (describing a book that argues that “new rules
of English” have displaced old rules of language, implying that readers are able to comprehend
speech on the internet).
150. Jacobus, 51 N.Y.S.3d at 339 (quoting Brian v. Richardson, 660 N.E.2d 1126, 1130
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1995)).
151. Id. at 342.
2016).

152. Levitt v. Felton, No. 326362, 2016 WL 2944824, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. May 19,
153. Id. (defining the reasonable reader by analogizing from traditional media cases).
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determine whether the tweet was parody, rather than assuming that the
speech is false or opinion simply because it appears on Twitter. 155

B. Defining the Relevant Context of a Tweet
Courts have also taken different approaches to defining the context of
an allegedly defamatory tweet. 156 In particular, the lack of context surrounding tweets 157 and the interactive nature of Twitter 158 has raised difficult questions regarding the relevance of content extrinsic to the tweet as it
appears on the timeline. 159

154. Id. at *4; cf. Jacobus, 51 N.Y.S. 3d at 342. See also SMOLLA, supra note 142, §
6:70.50 (arguing that the Jacobus court’s reasoning was incorrect; “[t]hat some actors in society
may be losing a grip on truth . . . does not mean that courts of law should [because] defamation
law assumes juries are competent to distinguish true facts from false ones”).
155. Levitt, 2016 WL 2944824, at *4; cf. Jacobus, 51 N.Y.S. 3d at 342 (reasoning that
because “truth itself has been lost in the cacophony of online and Twitter verbiage . . . [the statement] is reasonably viewed as a loose, figurative, and hyperbolic reference to a plaintiff’s state of
mind). See also SMOLLA, supra note 142, § 6:70.50.
156. Compare Winter v. Pinkins, No. 14–cv–8817, 2017 WL 5496278, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 17, 2017) (considering only the text of the tweet alone) with Levitt, 2016 WL 2944824, at *3
(considering the plaintiff’s profession as an attorney and a professor when determining that such a
person would not say such inappropriate things as those said by the parody account).
157. See Hunt, supra note 28, at 593 (arguing that, because of the character limitation on
Twitter, tweets should be considered in the context of information beyond just the timeline).
Note that, at the time of Hunt’s article, tweets were limited to a maximum of 140 characters, but
now may be as long as 280 characters, though that does not weigh heavily in the analysis. See
Sarah Perez, Twitter’s Doubling of Character Count From 140 to 280 Had Little Impact on
Length of Tweets, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 30, 2018, 6:51 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/10/30
/twitters-doubling-of-character-count-from-140-to-280-had-little-impact-on-length-of-tweets/
[https://perma.cc/J7DR-2REY].
158. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & RonNell Andersen Jones, Of Reasonable Readers and
Unreasonable Speakers: Libel Law in a Networked World, 23 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 155, 165
(2016) (discussing how the interactive nature of hashtags applies to the defamation analysis on
Twitter).
159. See, e.g., Hunt, supra note 28, at 593 (proposing that courts read tweets in light of
the account’s contemporaneously posted tweets when determining whether the tweet is defamatory). On Twitter, “Home timelines display a stream of Tweets from Twitter accounts that have
been followed or selected by the account creator.” Johnson, supra note 113, at 65, 81 n.12 (describing how Twitter parody accounts rely on linguistic, social, and political clues to create meaning).
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Some courts consider only the language of the tweet itself. 160 Other
courts consider only the content immediately surrounding the tweet, as it
appears on the timeline, when determining whether the tweet is defamatory. 161 For example, the Levitt court considered the defendant’s Twitter account name, which appears above the tweet on the timeline, 162 when determining whether the parody account was defamatory. 163 In the context of
another social media website, Disqus, which is “very similar to Twitter,” in
how disparate user posts also appear on a home timeline, 164 a court found
that the account name “Knotty is a Tramp” above the post indicated the
post was parody. 165 In O’Donnell v. Knott, the statement was nondefamatory because, the court reasoned, “a reasonable reader would not believe
that Kathryn Knott [the plaintiff] actually created this profile [to] comment
on articles about herself.” 166 The court reasoned that the account’s unflattering profile picture, featuring the subject of the parody drinking a bottle
of alcohol, also indicated that the account was parody. 167
Finally, some courts take a broad view of extrinsic content in Twitter
defamation, considering content beyond just the Twitter timeline. 168 While
the name, handle, and profile picture of the tweeting account are available
160. See, e.g., Winter, 2017 WL 5496278, at *2 (considering only the language of the
tweet itself); AvePoint, Inc. v. Power Tools, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 2d 496, 509 (W.D. Va. 2013).
161. See, e.g., Levitt, 2016 WL 2944824, at *3 (reading an allegedly defamatory tweet in
the context of the name of the tweeting account).
162. Id.; see, e.g., Johnson, supra note 113, at 62 (showing an image of a tweet on the
timeline with the account name above the text of the tweet).
163. See also O’Donnell v. Knott, 283 F. Supp. 3d 286, 301 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (finding that
a post was non-defamatory parody when the account that made the post was called “Knotty the
Tramp”). The O’Donnell case is not from Twitter, but rather from Disqus, a social media website
that is similar to Twitter.
164. Id. at 292.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 301.
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., Jacobus v. Trump, 51 N.Y.S.3d 330, 344 (Sup. Ct. 2017) (considering additional tweets from the defendant’s account, which a Twitter user only could have seen by navigating to the user’s account from the timeline and scrolling through hundreds of tweets from the
account, when determining whether a different tweet from the account was defamatory).
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immediately surrounding the tweet on the home timeline, 169 there is additional information that may furnish tweets with context. Other tweets from
the same account that posted the allegedly defamatory tweet can be relevant, some courts have held. 170 This is akin to considering an internal article when interpreting the meaning of a front-page headline because additional tweets from the same account are not available on the timeline with
the statement at issue; the additional tweets instead appear a click and a
scroll away. 171 For example, the Jacobus court read the defendant’s allegedly defamatory tweet that the plaintiff “begged” for a job in light of the
general tone of the defendant’s tweets, which were “rife with vague and
simplistic insults.” 172 Those tweets were weighed heavily by the court,
though the reader would not necessarily have seen them without clicking
and scrolling. 173 The court reasoned that this fact made it less likely that
the reasonable reader would take the tweet at issue as alleging actual facts
about a person. 174 In another case, Feld v. Conway, the court similarly considered content external to the Twitter timeline to be relevant to a tweet’s
meaning. 175 There, the court reasoned that the tweet should be construed
within the context of a contemporaneous “heated internet debate” that preceded the post. 176 As a result, the casual and interactive nature of Twitter
has complicated the defamatory meaning analysis even further. Part IV

line).

169. See Johnson, supra note 113, at 62 (showing the image of a tweet on a Twitter time-

170. See, e.g., Jacobus, 51 N.Y.S.3d at 344 (reading an allegedly defamatory tweet in
context of the general tone of defendant’s account); Levitt v. Felton, No. 326362, 2016 WL
2944824, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. May 19, 2016) (reading an allegedly defamatory tweet in the context of disclaimer tweets that the same account had previously posted).
171. Johnson, supra note 113, at 77–78 (describing the various ways in which users can
interact with content on Twitter).
172. Jacobus, 51 N.Y.S.3d at 342.
173. Johnson, supra note 113, at 77 (distinguishing between the profile information on
Twitter, available on the timeline, and the additional “exchanges . . . visible via the profile page . .
. [that] displays the [t]weets from that participant”).
174. Jacobus, 51 N.Y.S. 3d at 343.
175. Feld v. Conway, 16 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D. Mass. 2014) (describing how “the tweet was
made as part of a heated Internet debate about plaintiff’s responsibility for the disappearance of
[a] horse.”).
176. Id.
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proposes a methodology for interpreting how the reasonable reader would
understand parody tweets.

IV. METHOD TO DETERMINE WHETHER PARODY TWEETS ARE
DEFAMATORY
At 280 characters or less, 177 tweets are extremely short, so they raise
similar questions as front-page headlines regarding whether extrinsic content is relevant to interpreting a statement. 178 Additionally, parody accounts are ubiquitous on Twitter, 179 providing additional reasons to consider how readers interpret contextual clues on such platform. 180 Twitter is
unique among social media websites in that it actually explicitly permits
users to create parody accounts and has detailed policies regarding how
parody accounts must signal their satirical nature to Twitter users. 181 As a
result, parody accounts have become extremely common and notable aspects of Twitter. 182 Because parody authors often require context to communicate meaning, 183 there are many reasons for courts to characterize
Twitter users as rational and adept at interpreting extrinsic content in order
to preserve the viability of parody Twitter accounts, which often produce
important social commentary. 184
177. See Perez, supra note 157.
178. Lidsky & Jones, supra note 158, at 161.
179. See Ashley Parker, Fake Twitter Accounts Get Real Laughs, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9,
2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/10/us/politics/10fake-twitter.html [https://perma.cc
/9H7M-4DE7].
180. Johnson, supra note 113, at 65, 67 (describing how Twitter parody accounts rely on
linguistic, social, and political clues to create meaning).
181. Johnson, supra note 113, at 65 (explaining that Twitter is “[u]nusual among social
media and tech companies, [because it] has long supported parody through official policy”); Parody, Newsfeed, Commentary, and Fan Account Policy (The “Policy”), TWITTER, https://
help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/parody-account-policy [https://perma.cc/BK4T-UDLE].
182. See Parker, supra note 179.
183. Johnson, supra note 113, at 65, 67 (describing how Twitter parody accounts rely on
linguistic, social, and political context).
184. See, e.g., @DennisPBlock, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/dennispblock?lang=en
[https://perma.cc/9NFR-X42M] (using parody to critique the harsh practices of a well-known Los
Angeles eviction attorney). See also, Jessica Garrison, He Shows Renters the Door, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar, 14, 2007, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2007-mar-14-me-
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Additionally, like other social media websites, Twitter is interactive, which raises additional questions about the context analysis. Unlike
a static print publication, Twitter allows users to “click[]” and “open”
tweets to “expand its conversations” and see other users’ replies to the
tweet. 186 Users can also click away from the Twitter timeline, where
“[t]weets are usually encountered in streams of [other tweets],” to another
user’s profile page. 187 The Restatement approach to context, however, describes stable print publications, like newspapers and letters. 188 The Restatement is able to generalize from what readers “ordinarily” see when
reading a letter, namely the text of the letter from beginning to end. 189 But
what do readers actually see when reading tweets? 190 Should courts find
the hypothetical reader of a tweet to have simply read the tweet as it appears on the timeline, or to have clicked on the tweet to see extrinsic content? Developing a methodology for interpreting the reasonable reader of
tweets and how they interact with contextual clues on Twitter, first and
foremost, is helpful to clarify the path forward for courts as they increasingly see more cases involving tweets intended as parody.
However, giving courts a clear sense of how rational users interact
with Twitter and parody accounts is extremely important in other contexts
as well. Several state legislatures have passed laws criminalizing online
impersonation to cause harm, aimed at punishing actions like cyberbullying
and catfishing. 191 For example, California has a statute prohibiting “know185

evictlawyer14-story.html [https://perma.cc/MBA6-GDV4] (explaining that the attorney “describes himself [as] ‘[a] man who evicted more tenants than any other human being on the planet
Earth.’”).
185. See Hunt, supra note 28, at 579–80 (describing the various actions that users on
Twitter can take, such as retweeting, commenting, and replying on tweets).
186. Johnson, supra note 113, at 77–78.
187. Id. at 67.
188. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 563 cmt. d (using both newspaper headlines
and letters to describe the proper approach to context).
189. Id.
190. See Johnson, supra note 113, at 67, 77–78 (describing how “[o]n Twitter, users interact with tweets in a variety of ways, including scrolling past them on the timeline and clicking
on the tweet to read replies.”).
191. McSherry, supra note 30.
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ingly and without consent credibly impersonat[ing] [a person online] . . .
for purposes of harming” them. 192 But commentators have noted that this
law, and other similar ones, threaten to sweep up Twitter parody authors in
their enforcement. 193 Since Twitter parody accounts often purport to speak
in the voice of the parody’s subject, 194 they may be accused of impersonation. 195 This is especially problematic as Twitter parody cases often implicate core First Amendment speech on issues in the public interest. 196
Thus, it is particularly important to clarify how the reasonable Twitter
user interprets meaning on the platform, not only in the defamation context,
but also in the context of e-personation statutes. This section first argues
that courts should interpret reasonable Twitter users as discerning, like the
reasonable reader in traditional media. 197 Then, this section analogizes
from the contextual analysis in traditional media to propose the context in
which to analyze the meaning of an allegedly defamatory parody tweet.

A. Characterize Hypothetical Readers on Twitter as Rational and
Discerning
When hypothesizing the traits of the reasonable Twitter reader, courts
should not characterize the hypothetical Twitter reader as less rational and
discerning than the hypothetical reader of traditional media, 198 as the
Jacobus court did. Because it is often more difficult to discern truth from

192. CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5(a) (West 2020).
193. McSherry, supra note 30.
nal.”).

194. Johnson, supra note 113, at 68 (“Parody constitutes, reproduces, and alters an origi-

195. McSherry, supra note 30. Additionally, because parodies are often critical of the
parodied individual, commentators fear that the intent element will be satisfied.
196. See, e.g., Nunes v. Twitter, Inc., No. 19-1715, 2020 Va. Cir. LEXIS 89 (Va. Cir.
June 24, 2020) (illustrating a case against a Twitter parody account that criticizes a U.S. Congressmen for his political actions); Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 37, at *8 (describing a
defamation lawsuit against a Twitter parody account that criticized a well-known Los Angeles
eviction attorney for causing harm in the community).
197. See discussion supra Part II.A.
198. Jacobus v. Trump, 51 N.Y.S.3d 330, 337 (Sup. Ct. 2017) (describing the reasonable
reader).
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falsity online than in traditional media, 199 and on Twitter specifically, some
courts have reasoned that hypothetical Twitter readers should not be
deemed as adept at navigating context as their traditional-media-reader
counterparts. 200 This approach is rooted in the rule from traditional media
that courts sometimes look to actual factors to interpret the reasonable
reader and how they would understand an allegedly defamatory tweet. 201
In particular, the Jacobus court’s citation to the “incoherence” of internet
speech 202 seems to arise implicitly from social commentaries noting the
problems with disinformation online and on Twitter specifically, and the
inability of many readers to determine fact from fiction on Twitter. 203
However, while real circumstances of reader behavior can inform the
hypothetical reader’s traits, they are not necessarily dispositive. 204 Thus,
the fact that there actually is disinformation online that sometimes confuses
Twitter readers 205 does not necessarily mean that the hypothetical Twitter
reader is unable to navigate context on Twitter as a general rule. 206 In fact,
in traditional media, courts have typically favored an interpretation of the
reader as rational and able to decode context, 207 even when actual readers
199. Id. at 339 (quoting Brian v. Richardson, 660 N.E.2d 1126, 1130 (N.Y. Ct. App.
1995)).
200. See, e.g., id.
201. See discussion supra Part II.A. See, e.g., Embrey v. Holly, 442 A.2d 966, 968 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1982) (considering how some listeners mistook a radio host’s statement as true
when determining whether it was defamatory).
202. Jacobus, 51 N.Y.S.3d at 339.
203. Banjo, supra note 136.
204. See, e.g., New Times, Inc. v. Isaacks, 146 S.W.3d 144, 144–45 (Tex. 2004) (holding
that a newspaper was parody despite the fact that some readers mistook it as true).
205. Banjo, supra note 136.
206. See SMOLLA, supra note 142, § 6:70.50; see also Nelson v. Superior Court, No.
B283743, 2018 WL 1061575, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2018) as modified on denial of reh’g,
Mar. 27, 2018 (unpublished) (interpreting an allegedly defamatory parody YouTube video).
“While courts have recognized that online posters often ‘play fast and loose with facts,’ this
should not be taken to mean online commentators are immune from defamation liability.”
207. See, e.g., New Times, Inc., 146 S.W.3d at 158–59; see also Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (characterizing the hypothetical reader as rational and able to understand political context).
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in particular circumstances have proven to be less adept at interpreting an
author’s intended meaning. 208 In New Times, Inc. v. Isaacks, for instance,
though some readers of a fake parody newspaper article mistook the statement as true, 209 the court found that the reasonable reader would understand the article as parody. 210 There, the context of the “then-existing [public] controversy” regarding the school board’s punishment of a student
indicated to the reasonable reader that the traditional media statement did
not allege actual facts. 211 The Levitt court correctly tracked this reasoning
in the Twitter realm, 212 determining what the reasonable reader would understand from the context rather than presuming that the parody tweet was
too “vague and simplistic” 213 to be defamatory simply because it appeared
on Twitter. Thus, courts should still find that Twitter readers are adept at
interpreting context, 214 as problems with disinformation online are not dispositive in the reasonable reader analysis.

208. See, e.g., San Francisco Bay Guardian, Inc. v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464,
467 (Ct. App. 1993) (finding a newspaper article nondefamatory parody despite the fact that the
plaintiff mistook the article as true). Additionally, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Packingham v. North Carolina implicitly lends support to the view that courts should find the hypothetical reader of tweets to be as attuned to contextual clues as the hypothetical reader in traditional contexts. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (referring to social
media as the new “democratic forum,” which implies that the same theories about the need for
rational actors in the marketplace of ideas should also apply on social media).
209. The confusion resulted from the fact that the parody article was featured in the
“News” section of the paper. New Times, Inc., 146 S.W.3d at 159.
210. Id. at 161.
211. Id.; see also Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20 (implicitly assuming that reasonable readers of
appellant’s jacket would understand it as a reference to the national context of opposition to the
draft).
212. Levitt v. Felton, No. 326362, 2016 WL 2944824, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. May 19,
2016) (considering a statement in its relevant context to determine its meaning); see also
SMOLLA, supra note 142, § 6:70.50 (criticizing the Jacobus court’s approach to presuming the
nondefamatory nature of tweets rather than examining them in context as a reasonable reader
would).
213. Jacobus v. Trump, 51 N.Y.S.3d 330, 342 (Sup. Ct. 2017).
214. SMOLLA, supra note 142, § 6:70.50 (describing how the reasonable reader is hypothetical, rather than the lowest common denominator).
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B. Read Tweets in Context
In addition to characterizing Twitter readers as able and willing to interpret contextual clues, 215 courts should analogize from the Restatement
approach 216 to determine which context is relevant when interpreting a
tweet. Under that approach, courts should consider the information contained in the tweet as it appears on the Twitter timeline, including the
tweeting account’s name, handle, and profile picture. Additionally, courts
should consider content extrinsic to the Twitter timeline, including the
tweeting account’s bio and other tweets in the same thread, in order to protect the First Amendment rights of Twitter parody authors.

1. Relevant Content on the Timeline
When considering whether a tweet intended as parody has defamatory
meaning, courts should first look to the tweet as it appears on the timeline.
This immediate context includes the name, handle, and profile picture of
the account that posted the tweet. Twitter users interact with content in a
variety of ways, 217 but the primary place where they encounter tweets is
through the timeline, a homepage containing a stream of tweets from various accounts, 218 including accounts that the user follows and accounts that
Twitter has promoted. 219 From the timeline, users can take different actions. For example, they can click on links contained within tweets in the
timeline stream, thus navigating to external websites. 220 Additionally, by
clicking on a tweet, users can navigate from the timeline to the account that
215. See Johnson, supra note 113, at 65–67 (describing how Twitter parody accounts
communicate meaning to readers through the use of linguistic, social, and political context).
216. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 563.
217. Hunt, supra note 28, at 579–80 (describing the various actions that users on Twitter
can take, such as retweeting, commenting, and replying on tweets).
218. See Johnson, supra note 113, at 67. Accounts on the feed include accounts that the
user follows, as well as accounts that Twitter promotes on the user’s feed. About Your Twitter
Timeline, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/twitter-timeline [https://perma.cc
/FG97-7KKJ].
219. Hunt, supra note 28, at 587.
220. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 113, at 66 (discussing a parody author’s use of hyperlinks on their account to direct readers to different webpages); see also Lidsky & Jones, supra
note 158, at 164-65 (describing the role of hyperlinks on social media).

LUX_MACROS_V4 (DO NOT DELETE)

30

1/2/2021 10:43 PM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1

posted the tweet, in order to see more content regarding the account’s past
tweets. 221
Despite the interactive nature of Twitter and the many ways in which
users can interact with the platform, courts can still analogize from the Restatement’s approach to defining relevant context. 222 Recall that the Restatement defines an allegedly defamatory statement’s relevant context as
“all parts of the communication that are ordinarily heard or read with it.” 223
For example, the relevant context to interpret an allegedly defamatory
statement contained within a letter is “the entire contents of a personal letter” since readers “ordinarily” read the whole letter at once. 224
Though Twitter is less stable than a letter, and different reasonable
users may interact with the same tweet in different ways, 225 courts should
look to the tweet as it appears on the timeline when determining whether a
reader would view the statement as defamatory. The timeline is where users interact with most tweets, and thus it is the most stable medium in
which to view a tweet as the reader “ordinarily” sees it. 226 On the timeline,
the tweet contains several identifying features of the account that posted the
tweet. 227 Directly above the text of the tweet itself, the tweet includes the
name of the account that posted the tweet in white print, 228 as well as the

221. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 113, at 77 (showing the image of a Twitter parody profile picture).
cmt. d.

222.

See generally, Johnson, supra note 113; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 563

223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See Johnson, supra note 113, at 67 (describing how communication on Twitter
emerges from “the interaction of platform structure, interface design, and numerous account creators”).
226. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 563 cmt. d; see also Johnson, supra note 113,
at 67 (discussing how “[t]weets are not usually encountered in isolation,” but on the timeline).
227. Johnson, supra note 113, at 67 (showing an image of a series of tweets on the Twitter timeline, each with identifying features such as a name and profile picture).
228. Id.
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account’s handle in gray print, 229 and a small, thumbnail version of the account’s profile picture. 230
This identifying information should be relevant when interpreting
whether reasonable readers would understand a tweet as nondefamatory
parody. Just as courts have found that allegedly defamatory statements
contained in an article cannot be parsed line by line but must be interpreted
within the meaning of the article as a whole, 231 courts should also not read
tweets outside the context of at least the tweeting account’s name, handle,
and profile picture, which readers “ordinarily read[] . . . at [the same] time”
as the tweet itself. 232
Notably, for some parody accounts, this information on the timeline
alone may be sufficient to demonstrate to readers that the tweet does not
allege actual facts about the parodied individual and thus cannot be defamatory. For example, in Levitt, one allegedly defamatory tweet stated,
“Buying me a drink at Cabin Karaoke will get you extra [credit] . . . .” 233
The text alone is slightly odd and may signal to readers that the statement is
parody, 234 but considered in the context of the Levitt 2.0 account’s name,
handle, and profile picture, reasonable readers 235 would almost certainly
understand the statement as parody. The name of the account, “Levitt
2.0,” 236 like the Disqus account, “Knotty the Tramp,” 237 had a name slight229. Id.; see Walker, supra note 3.
230. Johnson, supra note 113, at 67; see also id. at 77 (showing the full-size image of a
Twitter parody profile picture, beyond the timeline).
231. See Cianci v. New Times Pub. Co., 639 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1980) (considering the
statements in context of the article as a whole).
232. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 563 cmt. d.
2016).

233. Levitt v. Felton, No. 326362, 2016 WL 2944824, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. May 19,

234. See, e.g., San Francisco Bay Guardian, Inc. v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464,
466 (Ct. App. 1993) (describing the parody statement, “I find that my tenants who have undergone [electroshock therapy] are much more cooperative” as subtle parody, since it is slightly on
its face but does not include rhetorical language or obvious parody).
235. Id.
236. Levitt, 2016 WL 2944824, at *3.
237. See Jacobus v. Trump, 51 N.Y.S.3d 330, 343 (Sup. Ct. 2017); Feld v. Conway, 16 F.
Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D. Mass. 2014); O’Donnell v. Knott, 283 F.Supp.3d 286, 301 (E.D. Pa. 2017)
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ly altering the parody subject’s name, indicating that the account and its
tweets may be jokes. 238 And though the Levitt court did not consider the
account’s profile picture or handle, 239 the Levitt 2.0 handle,
“@levittlawyer,” 240 weighs against a finding of parody, since the statement
on its face does not appear odd or indicate a joke. 241 But the account’s profile picture, a kitschy posed photograph of a man in a fedora, 242 would indicate to the reasonable reader that the tweet is parody. 243
Thus, courts should consider the name, handle, and profile picture of
an account when interpreting whether reasonable readers would understand
a tweet as defamatory, since readers would ordinarily see that context when
reading the tweet on the timeline.

2. Relevant Content Beyond the Timeline
In addition to interpreting tweets in the context of the identifying features that appear on the timeline, courts should also look to several aspects
of the account that tweeted the allegedly defamatory tweet, beyond content
that appears directly on the Twitter timeline. In particular, the following
section argues that courts should look to the tweeting account’s bio 244 and

(finding that a post was non-defamatory parody when the account that made the Disqus post was
called “Knotty the Tramp”).
238. O’Donnell, 283 F.Supp.3d at 301.
239. Levitt, 2016 WL 2944824, at *4 (considering only the name of the account, the language of the tweet, and similarities to the parodied account when interpreting the allegedly defamatory tweet).
240. @levittlawyer, supra note 1.
241. Cf. San Francisco Bay Guardian, Inc. v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 467
(Ct. App. 1993) (describing how the parody letter-to-the-editor’s language was sufficiently odd to
make the reasonable reader notice it might not be intended as factual).
242. @levittlawyer, supra note 1.
243. See, e.g., O’Donnell, 283 F.Supp.3d at 292 (finding a post from a Disqus account
nondefamatory when its profile picture featured an unflattering image of the subject of the parody
account drinking from a bottle of alcohol); see also Johnson, supra note 113, at 75 (depicting the
profile picture of a parody Twitter account, featuring a Bahraini political figure’s smiling face
with sunglasses on and a slightly theatrical pose).
244. Walker, supra note 3 (describing what a Twitter bio is).
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other tweets in the same thread 245 when determining whether the account is
defamatory.
As described above, tweets appear on the timeline with relatively little context, when compared to traditional media. 246 A maximum of 280
characters, 247 in addition to several identifying features of the relevant account, are all that readers “ordinarily” view on the timeline. 248 By comparison, courts have found that readers in traditional media “ordinarily” see
information within the context of an entire newspaper article. 249
This lack of context makes Twitter parody authors particularly vulnerable to defamation liability. Parodies often rely on all sorts of contextual information, including cultural and political information, to create meaning. 250 But because tweets are so short, 251 parody authors must squeeze the
relevant contextual information into a very short tweet in order to escape
liability. 252
In similar contexts in which readers may actually read statements with
very little context, the majority of courts have nonetheless held that First
Amendment principles required greater context. 253 For example, though
many newspaper readers often skim only headlines, the majority of courts
245. How to Create A Thread on Twitter, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/usingtwitter/create-a-thread [https://perma.cc/24CQ-BHR9] (“A thread on Twitter is a series of connected Tweets from one person.”).
246. Id.
247. Perez, supra note 157.
248. See Johnson, supra note 113, at 67 (explaining the content that Twitter users see on
the timeline).
249. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 563 cmt. d; see, e.g., New Times, Inc. v.
Isaacks, 146 S.W.3d 144, 149 (Tex. 2004) (reading an allegedly defamatory statement contained
in a newspaper article within the whole article).
250. See Johnson, supra note 113, at 67 (describing how Twitter parody accounts rely on
complex contextual clues).
251. Perez, supra note 157 (noting that tweets are limited to a maximum of 280 characters
but are often shorter than that).
252. See Hunt, supra note 28, at 593 (arguing that courts should consider content extrinsic
to the tweet when analyzing whether it is defamatory since tweets are so short).
253. King, Jr., supra note 85, at 884.
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depart from the Restatement approach for allegedly defamatory headlines
and include the article in the context analysis. 254 Free speech advocates
support this approach as less burdensome on speech. 255
It would be appropriate to apply this front-page headline majority approach to tweets, 256 which, like headlines, are brief and exist in very little
context on the Twitter timeline, with “streams of [other] [t]weets.” 257 As a
result, courts should look beyond just the relevant content on the timeline
when analyzing tweets intended as parody. Namely, context of the tweeting account’s bio, as well as any contemporaneous tweets included in the
same thread as the allegedly defamatory tweet.
First, the context for interpreting a tweet’s defamatory meaning
should include the Twitter bio. The Twitter official parody policy requires
Twitter parody accounts to indicate their parodic nature in the bio, such as
by writing: “This is a parody.” 258 Additionally, unlike some other sources
of extrinsic information, 259 the bio is easily accessible from the timeline.260
Users can see the bio by hovering the mouse over the tweet on the timeline
or clicking on the tweet itself to navigate to the account page, meaning that
even under the minority approach to headlines, courts may find that the bio
is relevant. 261 Thus, given the need for extrinsic content to interpret parody
254. Id.
255. Id. at 908.
256. See Hunt, supra note 28, at 562; King, Jr., supra note 85, at 908 (describing how the
majority approach to headline can and should be applied to the internet).
257. Johnson, supra note 113, at 67 (describing the Twitter timeline).
258. Parody, Newsfeed, Commentary, and Fan Account Policy, supra note 181; see, e.g.,
Johnson, supra note 113, at 65 (describing how Twitter parody authors use differences between
the bio, name, and profile picture features to communicate meaning).
259. Johnson, supra note 113, at 66. Additional tweets from the account that posted the
allegedly defamatory tweet, for example, would require the user to navigate away from the timeline to the allegedly defamatory tweet.
260. Id. (displaying an image of a Twitter timeline). Cf. Kaelin v. Globe Commc’ns
Corp., 162 F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 1998) (considering how accessible content is from the allegedly defamatory statement when determining whether it is relevant to the defamatory analysis).
261. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 563 cmt. d; see, e.g., Kaelin, 162 F.3d at
1041 (taking the minority approach to allegedly defamatory front-page headlines, reading them in
the context of the internal article only when circumstances indicate that readers ordinarily would
see the article).
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tweet 262 and the extra protection that courts seek to give parody which is
often crucial to political speech, 263 courts should consider the bio when interpreting whether a tweet intended as parody is defamatory.
The Levitt court did not consider the Levitt 2.0 bio, which states that
the account is “[a] badass parody on our favorite lawyer,” 264 when determining whether the tweets at issue were defamatory. However, it considered similar content, namely an old tweet that Levitt 2.0 had posted which
stated, “This is a parody account. You can find the real Todd(ler)
@levittlaw.” 265 Since the content of such disclaimer tweets is so similar to
the content typically found in the Twitter bio, a more principled approach
would be to consider the bio that the parody author likely hoped would furnish their statements with meaning. 266
Furthermore, the same reasons for examining the bio as context for an
allegedly defamatory tweet also support looking to other tweets in a thread.
A thread is “a series of connected [t]weets from one person” that the author
intends to be read together. 267 When an allegedly defamatory statement is
included in a tweet that is part of a thread, both courts and commentators
have considered the additional content in the thread as relevant to interpreting the statement at issue. 268 In Levitt, because the tweets at issue did not
involve a thread, the court should have only examined the bio under this
Note’s approach. 269 But in Feld v. Conway, a court considered the alleged262. See Hunt, supra note 28, at 593 (arguing that courts should consider content extrinsic
to the tweet when analyzing whether it is defamatory since tweets are so short).
263. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 54 (1988) (describing how
satirical cartoons of “Boss” Tweed ushered in the end of Gilded Age corruption).
264. @levittlawyer, supra note 1.
2016).

265. Levitt v. Felton, No. 326362, 2016 WL 2944824, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. May 19,

266. See Johnson, supra note 113, at 66 (describing how Twitter parody authors utilize
the bio as a tool to create meaning).
267. How to Create a Thread on Twitter, supra note 245.
268. See, e.g., Feld v. Conway, 16 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D. Mass. 2014) (considering tweets
in the same thread when interpreting an allegedly defamatory statement); see also Hunt, supra
note 28, at 588–89 (advocating for courts to consider “contemporaneously” posted tweets when
interpreting an allegedly defamatory statement).
269. Levitt, 2016 WL 2944824, at *1.
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ly defamatory statement contained within a Twitter thread in light of the
thread as a whole, which made clear that the statement was merely “heated” rhetoric amid a debate. 270 Because Twitter parody authors perform important political functions 271 and are highly vulnerable to defamation liability, 272 courts should also consider allegedly defamatory tweets in the
context of the tweeting account’s bio and tweets in the same thread.

V. CONCLUSION
Defamatory meaning analysis has always been a challenge, even
when conveyed in traditional media. Parody complicates the inquiry even
more because it is so nuanced and dependent on context for its meaning.
Add to the mix the new context of Twitter and the advent of online epersonation criminal laws, and the stakes only increase. As a result, courts
must understand Twitter parody accounts, their relevant characteristics, and
how reasonable Twitter users interpret context.
As with front-page headlines, short tweets should be interpreted in the
context of the extrinsic content relevant to its meaning. 273 But courts need
not get involved in overly time-consuming analyses of various tweets that
are irrelevant. Rather, courts should look at several identifying features of
accounts that help real Twitter users understand meaning on the website
and are either visible or easily accessible from the timeline. In the context
of e-personation, these same characteristics—the name of the account, the
account handle, its bio, and profile picture—can also help to determine
whether a fake account is sufficiently credible to constitute online impersonation. This Note also provides a springboard to analyze liability for allegedly defamatory speech on other interactive online platforms. 274 Most
270. Feld, 16 F. Supp. 3d at 4.
271. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 113, at 61–62 (describing how parody Twitter accounts are often created in the wake of political and social uprisings to rebel against systems of
power).
272. See Hunt, supra note 28, at 588–89; see also McCraw, supra note 49, at 94–95 (describing how “[t]he problem [with parody] is that statements of opinion, as well as parody and
hyperbole, may be read to imply the existence of facts” absent contextual clues).
273. See supra Part II.B.1.
274. See, e.g., Adelson v. Harris, 973 F. Supp. 2d 467, 483–484 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding
that the fair report privilege applied to a webpage because the “average reader” would click on a
hyperlink to the news source, even though “one can verify a hyperlinked source’s content only
through ‘external navigation’”).
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of all, however, the proposed methodology seeks to facilitate the important
political and social commentary that flows from Twitter parody accounts
and reduce the chilling effects of crushing defamation liability.

